Online Appendix

Lost in transition? The persistence of dictatorship mayors

Felipe González, Pablo Muñoz, and Mounu Prem¹

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
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Figure A.1: Who profited from the electoral rule in the 1992 election



Notes: Electoral results (**black bars**) and counterfactual results (**gray bars**) in the 1992 local elections under different electoral rules. Percentage of mayors by appointed or not in the left part of the figure and by political party in the right part of the figure. Black bars indicate the actual percentage of mayors elected, while gray bars represent the percentage of mayors elected in a counterfactual world with a simple majority rule to elect mayors.

Figure A.2: Data on local projects


DBRAS DEL SECTOR Pavimentación: Los Andes	de la obra	Linea de acción	Cant	Fecha Contrato	Fecha Term	Sup Unitaria m ²	Sup Total m ²	Costo Unitario U.F.	Costo Total U F	Origen Financ	Decreto de Contrato	pisos	agrupac	Contra tist
os Andes														
	Av. Argentina	Pavimentos nuevos		12-06-84	01-85	日本は山子			19.370	Sector	170		1.	24
Los Andes	Av. Argentina	Pavimentos nuevos		20-11-84	01-85				1.403	Sector	170			2
Viña del Mar	Av. 1 Norte	Varios		14-11-84	01-85	二十二十十		14-14-14-14	1.917	a second s	170			2
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Recuperación		20-06-85	08-85				439	Sector	29			1
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Recuperación	101-45	03-06-85	08-85				6.928	Sector	29			2
Viña del Mar	Granadillas 1-2-3-4	Pavimentos nuevos		12-03-85	09-85				7.733	Sector	29		-	2
Valparaiso		Recuperación		30-04-85	06-85				462		170			Ser Star
Valparaiso	Av. 11 de Septiembre	Varios		31-05-85	07-85				1.140	and the second s	170	Contract Charlos		
Quilpué Aco	ceso Puente El Belloto	Pavimentos nuevos		14-11-84	01-85				1.457	Sector	170		1000	2
Total inversión en pavime	entación								40.849			and set as a		1000
Otras obras:	Same and the state											122.00		
Valparaiso	Av. Altamirano	Varios		10-09-84	01-85				8.300	Sector	170			2
OBRAS POR CONVENIOS Y	MANDATOS SIN ADMINIS	STRACION FINANCIERA												alat_4
Saneamiento de poblacio	nes:													
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Quillota	Aconcagua Sur	Unidades Sanitarias	307	29-06-84	07-85	7,08	2.174	90,10		Municipal-BID	Especial			1
San Antonio	Varias obras	Unidades Sanitarias	327	31-07-84	08-85	7,08	2.315	105,18	a carta de la carta	Municipal-BID	Especial		Constant Shift	
Total			1.084				7.675		101.207		100 CT 100 CT			rocate
Pavimentación:						Separate So		12000	1					2
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Pavimentos nuevos		12-03-85	03-85				5.327	Municipal	170			
San Felipe	Av. 11 de Septiembre	Pavimentos nuevos		25-07-85	10-85		A STUDIE		6.462 11.789	Municipal	29	3.72.5	1995-1995	1
.MUE Condell						QUILLOT El Bajio	A							


Notes: The data section provides more details.

Figure A.3: Data on municipal spending	
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1 5000	SALDE INICIAL DE CAJA FLUCTUACION DEUDERES	100.621	1-642-671	-8.933	11:6	101.271	1
1 A.S		0	0	-39.056	1.642.6	1.633.737	6.533
			0	100-621		0	6.534
1						-23.446	23.440
	TOTALES	1.704.236	1.642.671	61.565	1.642.	671 1.610.251	32.36
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0000		318.595	645.158 261.499	9.244 57.496	645.	508 420-159 576 2-176 158 645-154	
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
Notes: The data section provides more details.





Notes: This figure shows the percentage of dictatorship mayors who decided to run in the 1992 election in each year that Pinochet was in power (1973-1990). In each year we observe all dictatorship mayors and then we check how many of them ran as candidate for mayor in 1992. The figure clearly shows that dictatorship mayors who were in office towards the end of the dictatorship were more likely to run in the 1992 election.





(b) Margin 6th/7th most voted (105 municipalities)

Notes: Panel (a) shows that when a candidate obtained more than 35% of the vote, then the probability of being elected in the 1992 election increased discontinuously. However, in all of these cases he or she won by a large margin of victory, invalidating the inherent randomness of close elections. Consequently, we do not have enough observations around the "cutoff" to implement this design. Panel (b) uses the vote margin between the 6th-7th candidates as the running variable. The vote margin has the expected sign but we cannot apply standard tools to choose the optimal bandwidth because there are few observations around the cutoff.

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Municipalities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Indicator misreporting local finance (1996)	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00	333
Municipal budget deficit (1993–1994)	1.00	0.06	0.76	1.36	333
Spending projects per capita (in \$, 1992–1996)	3.09	3.88	0.00	36.18	333
Number of projects per capita (1992–1996)	9.46	15.12	0.00	178.04	333

 Table A.1: Additional descriptive statistics

Notes: Data for misreporting of local finance and budget deficit comes from the General Accounting Office. Data for projects comes from annual reports of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanization.

		in dictators	hip	during transition			
Local spending variable:	Pro	ojects	Municipal	Projects		Municipal	
	Log \$	Number	Log \$	Log \$	Number	Log \$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Vote share for the right wing candidate in 1970	-0.08 (0.18)	-10.20 (12.11)	0.26** (0.13)	0.44 (0.35)	-1.65 (1.66)	-0.03 (0.07)	
Vote share for the left-wing candidate in 1970	-0.07 (0.20)	-16.29 (12.81)	0.13 (0.13)	0.02 (0.40)	1.45 (2.09)	-0.03 (0.06)	
Victims of repression per 1,000 inhab.	0.01 (0.04)	-0.16 (1.94)	0.04 (0.04)	0.15 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.22)	0.02 (0.01)	
Indicator military base in 1970	0.89*** (0.28)	-14.88** (6.77)	-0.48*** (0.16)	1.15*** (0.44)	-1.25 (1.22)	-0.23** (0.10)	
Intensity of protests 1983-84	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.78 (0.75)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.21)	0.08*** (0.03)	
Vote share NO in 1988 (referendum)				1.65*** (0.54)	-1.33 (1.73)	-0.27*** (0.08)	
Vote share opposition in 1989 (Aylwin)				-0.90* (0.54)	-4.20 (4.48)	0.04 (0.08)	
Municipalities	321	321	320	321	321	315	
R-squared	0.185	0.142	0.322	0.355	0.323	0.431	
Province fixed effects Avg. dependent variable	Yes 10.78	Yes 27.63	Yes 3.69	Yes 7.37	Yes 4.25	Yes 3.98	

Table A.2: Local spending in dictatorship and the transition to democracy

Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dictatorship mayor	0.15***	0.15***	0.18***	0.13***
1 7	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Incumbent mayor				0.10**
				(0.05)
Candidates	6,497	6,497	6,497	6,497
Municipalities	333	333	333	333
R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.11
Municipality fixed effects		Х	Х	Х
Political party fixed effects			Х	Х
Mean of dependent variable	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07

Table A.3: Winners in the first local election

The dependent variable is an indicator for the winners of the 1992 local election

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local election. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

	Vote	share	Indicator elected		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Dictatorship mayor	9.35***	9.48***	0.18***	0.18***	
	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Candidates	6,491	6,481	6,491	6,481	
Municipalities	333	333	333	333	
R-squared	0.30	0.31	0.12	0.14	
Municipality fixed effects	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Political party by region fixed effects	Х		Х		
Political party by province fixed effects		Х		Х	
Avg. dependent variable	5.13	5.13	0.07	0.07	

Table A.4: Robustness to flexible fixed effects by party in 1992

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local election. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246 and the number of incumbent dictatorship mayors is 117. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Sample:	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Incumbent	21.96***	13.36***	21.96***	14.56***	21.97***	13.74***	21.97***	13.88***
	(0.81)	(1.63)	(0.85)	(1.88)	(0.81)	(1.85)	(0.85)	(2.19)
Incumbent × Dictatorship mayor			-8.38***	-8.25			-8.83***	-0.98
			(2.76)	(6.81)			(2.70)	(8.11)
Dictatorship mayor			10.05***	5.56			10.55***	1.16
			(1.12)	(4.57)			(1.14)	(5.05)
Candidates (observations)	5,463	436	5,463	436	5,435	396	5,435	396
R-squared	0.459	0.528	0.482	0.533	0.471	0.629	0.496	0.630
Municipalities	341	196	341	196	340	179	340	179
Municipality fixed effects	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Political party by region fixed effects	Х	Х	Х	Х				
Political party by province fixed effects					Х	Х	Х	Х
Avg. dependent variable	6.242	22.70	6.242	22.70	6.248	22.88	6.248	22.88

The dependent variable is the vote share of candidates in the 1996 local election

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1996 local election. The full sample includes all candidates, while the restricted sample only includes winners (incumbents) and runner-ups from the 1992 elections who decided to run in the 1996 local elections, which occurred in 214 municipalities. In this sub-sample there are 260 incumbent mayors running for reelection, 27 of which were dictatorship mayors. In addition, there were 40 dictatorship mayors who were the runner-ups in 1992. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Local spending variable:	Develop	Municipal spending	
	Log spending per capita	Number of projects per capita	Log spending per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dictatorship mayor	9.57***	9.64***	9.50***
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.76)
\times Spending in democracy	0.19	-0.36	2.45
	(1.13)	(1.15)	(2.88)
\times Spending in transition	2.36*	3.74**	-0.22
	(1.33)	(1.50)	(3.26)
\times Spending in dictatorship	-0.05	1.10	1.26
	(0.96)	(0.94)	(1.91)
× Repression victims per 1,000 inhab	1.31	2.08	1.48
	(2.26)	(2.20)	(2.13)
Candidates (observations)	6,274	6,274	6,274
Municipalities	324	324	324
Municipality fixed effects	Х	Х	Х
Political party fixed effects	Х	Х	Х
Avg. dependent variable	5.164	5.164	5.164

Table A.6: Repression and the vote premium of dictatorship mayors

The dependent variable is the vote share of candidates in the 1992 local election

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local elections. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Local spending variable:	Develop	Development projects				
	Log spending per capita	Number of projects per capita	Log spending per capita			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
Non-Incumbent dictatorship mayor	6.35***	6.70***	6.56***			
	(0.88)	(0.94)	(0.92)			
× Spending in democracy	-2.60	-0.73	4.71			
	(2.05)	(1.27)	(3.51)			
\times Spending in transition	1.87	2.02	-7.85			
	(1.64)	(2.63)	(5.07)			
× Spending in dictatorship	1.90	1.50	6.91***			
	(1.26)	(0.96)	(2.56)			
Incumbent dictatorship mayor	12.47***	12.50***	12.28***			
	(1.19)	(1.20)	(1.12)			
\times Spending in democracy	0.64	0.05	8.92*			
	(0.74)	(1.60)	(4.65)			
\times Spending in transition	3.79	3.16*	-1.41			
	(2.63)	(1.70)	(3.54)			
× Spending in dictatorship	-3.33	1.43	-4.59**			
	(2.91)	(3.06)	(2.12)			
Candidates (observations) Municipalities	6,274 324 X	6,274 324 X	6,274 324 X			
Municipality fixed effects	X	X	X			
Political party fixed effects	X	X	X			
Avg. dependent variable	5.164	5.164	5.164			

Table A.7: The vote premium among incumbent and non-incumbent dictatorship mayors

 The dependent variable is the vote share of candidates in the 1992 local election

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local elections. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246 and the number of dictatorship prisoners is 514. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Coalition	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013	2017
Right-wing	A. Alessandri J. Piñera	J. Lavín	S. Piñera J. Lavín	S. Piñera	E. Matthei	S. Piñera J.A. Kast
Left-wing	E. Frei M. Max Neef E. Pizarro C. Reitze	R. Lagos G. Marín T. Hirsch	M. Bachelet T. Hirsch	E. Frei J. Arrate M. Enríquez	M. Bachelet M. Enríquez M. Claude A. Sfeir R. Miranda	A. Guillier C. Goic M. Enríquez E. Artés A. Navarro B. Sánchez

Table A.8: Candidates presidential elections 1993 – 2017

Notes: Own construction based on administrative data from the Electoral Service.

	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Right-wing	Participación y Prog. U. Centro Centro	Alianza Centro Centro	Alianza Centro Centro	Alianza	Alianza	Chile Vamos Amplitud
Left-wing	Concertación P. Comunista	Concertación La Izquierda Humanistas y Ecologistas	Concertación Juntos Podemos Hum. y Eco.	Concertación Dem. Juntos Podemos Hum. y Eco. Concertación Prog. Chile Limpio Fza. Norte	Concertación Dem. Chile en Otra El Cambio Por Ti Más Humanos Desarrollo Norte Chile Justo	Nueva Mayoría Cambiemos la Historia Yo Marco por el Cambio Alternativa Democrática Other (smaller)

 Table A.9: Coalitions local elections 1996 – 2016

Notes: Own construction based on administrative data from the Electoral Service.

Table A.10: Dictatorship mayors and electoral competition in democracy

	Perio	od: 1996-2000		Perio	od: 2004-2016	
Dependent variable:	Victory margin	Number of candidates	HHI	Victory margin	Number of candidates	HHI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A – Second stage						
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	-0.03 (0.08)	-2.31 (2.39)	-0.14** (0.06)	0.13 (0.09)	-1.04* (0.56)	0.07 (0.05)
Panel B – First stage						
Left-wing majority	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)
Municipality-year observations	210	210	210	416	419	420
Avg. dependent variable	0.15	13.44	0.48	0.19	3.27	0.47
KP F-test	21.18	21.18	21.18	21.31	21.36	21.33

The dependent variable is a measure of ex-ante or ex-post electoral competition

Notes: "HHI" stands for Herfindhal-Hirschman Index and measures the concentration of vote shares with higher values meaning more concentration and hence less competition. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.11: Political legacies in local elections by year

	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A – Second stage						
Dictatorship mayor elected	44.98***	13.64	23.30	3.45	21.10	5.65
	(14.22)	(13.25)	(14.31)	(13.33)	(15.35)	(15.72)
Panel B – First stage						
Left-wing majority	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Municipalities	105	105	105	104	100	100
Avg. dependent variable	39.38	40.50	36.83	37.21	38.29	40.13
KP F-test	20.86	20.86	20.86	20.95	19.42	19.13

The dependent variable is the vote share of right-wing candidates

Notes: All specifications only consider the set of municipalities with a close council composition, restrict attention to elections with at least one right-wing candidate, and control by municipality size category and victory margin. The number of municipalities with at least one right-wing candidate in the quasi-experimental sample drops from 105 to 100 from 2004 2016. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013	2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A – Second stage						
Dictatorship mayor elected	8.13	11.02	8.32	5.87	9.22*	14.80**
	(5.24)	(6.95)	(6.08)	(5.83)	(5.15)	(7.15)
Panel B – First stage						
Left-wing majority	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Municipalities	105	105	105	105	105	105
Avg. dependent variable	32.17	51.29	50.70	45.33	23.96	47.82
KP F-test	20.86	20.86	20.86	20.86	20.86	20.86

Table A.12: Political legacies in presidential elections by year

The dependent variable is the vote share of right-wing candidates

Notes: All specifications only consider the set of municipalities with a close council composition, and control by municipality size category and victory margin. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Sample:		Vote margin <5 pp.		Vote margin <2.5 pp.				
Dependent variable:	Right-wing vote share in local elections	Right-wing vote share in presid. elections	% right-wing councilors elected	Right-wing vote share in local elections	Right-wing vote share in presid. elections	% right-wing councilors elected		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Dictatorship mayor	19.08*	8.67	0.19**	21.62*	8.17	0.21*		
	(10.05)	(5.48)	(0.09)	(11.85)	(6.07)	(0.11)		
Observations	613	624	208	549	558	186		
Avg. dependent variable	38.71	41.96	0.201	38.75	41.76	0.204		
KP F-test	21.24	21.44	21.22	16.55	16.36	16.18		

Table A.13: Robustness to smaller vote margins

Notes: All specifications only consider the set of municipalities with a close council composition, and control by municipality size category, victory margin, and include year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Dependent variable	vote si	-wing hare in lections	Right-wing vote share in presid. elect.		% right-wing councilors elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dictatorship mayor	18.90*	12.79	9.16*	10.05**	0.18**	0.11
	(9.88)	(9.43)	(5.41)	(4.68)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	619	513	630	522	210	174
Avg. dependent variable	38.72	38.18	41.88	41.27	0.202	0.197
KP F-test	21.19	16.35	21.39	16.02	21.11	15.12
+ Vote margin ²	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
+ Other Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A.14: Robustness to additional controls

The dependent variable is the vote share of right-wing candidates

Notes: All specifications only consider the set of municipalities with a close council composition, and control by municipality size category, victory margin, and include year fixed effects. Other controls include right-wing vote share in 1958, vote share Eduardo Frei in 1964, right- and left-wing vote shares in 1970, an indicator for left-wing mayor in 1971, distances to Santiago and the regional capital, population density, and the percentage of women. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

		Panel data 1993-94	1	Cross-	section
	Budget deficit	Projects (number) per capita	Projects (\$) per capita	Change in night lights (1992-94)	Change in avg. wages (1992-94)
Panel A – Second stage	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dictatorship mayor elected	0.05 (0.04)	-2.47 (2.43)	-375.37 (337.63)	-0.45 (0.71)	-1.14 (0.76)
Panel B – First stage					
Left-wing majority council	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.08)
Municipality-year observations	205	205	205	103	46
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	1.00	2.19	432.6	0.734	0.364
K-P <i>F</i> -statistic	20.1	20.1	20.1	19.8	5.8

 Table A.15: The performance of dictatorship mayors in years without local elections

Notes: All specifications control by municipality size category and victory margin. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	Dependent variable is log of projects per capita							
	All	Housing	Urban	Emergency	Conservation	Other		
Panel A – Projects (N) per 10,000 inhab.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Dictatorship mayor elected	-1.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.4	0.5		
	(2.9)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(1.4)	(0.4)	(1.1)		
Avg. dependent variable	2.5	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.6		
Panel B – Projects (US\$) per 10,000 inhab.								
Dictatorship mayor elected	-523	-322	-141	-10	-28	-23		
	(369)	(211)	(156)	(14)	(23)	(42)		
Observations	411	411	411	411	411	411		
Avg. dependent variable	282	149	97	7	12	18		
KP F-test	20.18	20.18	20.18	20.18	20.18	20.18		

Table A.16: Dictatorship mayors and category of projects 1993-1996

Notes: All specifications control by municipality size category and victory margin. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.