ONLINE APPENDIX

The Political Consequences of Vaccines:

Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Eligibility Rules

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A Definition of Political Coalitions

We examine the impact of the vaccination process on two sets of outcomes Y_c. The first is *Turnout*, defined as total votes in election ℓ (including null and blank votes) over total number of people who are eligible to vote (i.e. *electores*), with ℓ being Local Elections (mayor), Local Elections (councilors), Constitutional Convention, and Governors. The second set of outcomes are *Vote Shares*, defined as votes for option j in the election over total number of votes, with j being defined as explained bellow.

A.1 Local Election

1.1 *Incumbent*, defined as the incumbent mayor running for reelection or the candidate from his/her coalition when the mayor is not running.

1.2 *Left-wing*, defined as those running in the following coalitions: Unidad por el Apruebo, Chile Digno Verde y Soberano, Unidos por la Dignidad, Dignidad Ahora,

1.3 *Right-wing*, defined as those running in the following coalitions: Chile Vamos, Republicanos, Independientes Cristianos, Ciudadanos Independientes, Nuevo Tiempo.

1.4 *Independent*, defined as those running in the following coalitions: Ecologistas e Independientes, Independientes fuera de pacto.

1.5 *Councilors*, same outcomes as the previous four but defined in the separate local election for councilors.

A.2 Constitutional Convention Election

2.1 *Left-wing*, defined as candidates running in the following lists: Lista del Apruebo (YB), Apruebo Dignidad (YQ), Partido Humanista (XG), Partido Ecologista (XA).

2.2 *Right-wing*, defined as candidates running in the list Vamos por Chile (XP).

2.3 *Independent*, defined as candidates in any of the 74 lists (A-ZZ) that are different from the five lists composed by candidates from left- or right-wing political parties.

2.4 *Invalid*, defined as null or blank votes over the total number of casted votes. This measure attempts to capture the level of confusion or disinformation in the population. Recent media articles suggest that some people appear to believe that they have to vote for multiple candidates. The confusion is understandable given that this is the first time a Constitutional Convention will be elected and there are reserved seats for women and indigenous people.

A.3 Regional Governors Election

3.1 *Left-wing*, defined as candidates in the following coalitions: Unidad Constituyente, Frente Amplio, Igualdad para Chile, Humanicemos Chile, Partido de Trabajadores Revolucionarios, Por Dignidad Regional,

3.2 *Right-wing*, defined as candidates in the following coalitions: Chile Vamos, Partido Republicano, Unión Patriótica, Partido Nacional Ciudadano, Independientes Cristianos,

3.3 *Independents*, defined as candidates in the following coalitions: Ecologistas e Independientes, Regionalistas Verdes, Independientes fuera de pacto.

B Alternative Explanations

B.1 Vaccines and anxiety in high-frequency surveys

This section explores why vaccines might increase preferences for challengers. This analysis was *not* part of the pre-analysis plan and we view it as more exploratory. We interpret the decision between the incumbent and a challenger through the lens of decision-making under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The incumbent represents the safe (known) alternative, while the challenger represents the uncertain (risky) option. Voters need to acquire information about challengers. We interpret the pandemic as affecting people's anxiety and ability to focus (Fetzer et al., 2022), difficulting information acquisition, and therefore tilting citizens towards incumbents, the safe and known alternative. Vaccines can reverse this process and thus potentially empower challengers. This hypothesis is consistent with previous research in political science and financial economics showing that during times of crisis or uncertainty, agents resort to the certainty provided by the status quo and safer assets (Cohn et al., 2015; Bisbee and Honig, 2021).

We use high-frequency surveys conducted in 2021 by an independent private firm. The surveys were implemented on a weekly basis and aim to be representative of the entire country. As such, the probabilistic sampling was geographically stratified, which led to respondents living in hundreds of municipalities located in all of the 16 regions in the country, with 90% living in urban and 10% in rural areas. Crucially, each weekly survey was conducted in less than three days, which means that the eligibility rules were fixed within a given survey. We use all surveys conducted from the first week of February 2021 until the first week of September 2021. Each survey was responded by more than 700 adults and thus we observe more than 22,000 survey respondents.

In order to exploit the roll-out of the vaccines following the weekly eligibility rules, we estimate the following regression equation using data from the surveys around the election:

$$y_{ij(i)} = \beta V_i + f(x_i) + \phi_{j(i)} + \eta_{ij(i)} \tag{5}$$

where $y_{ij(i)}$ is the response of person i who's age by the time of the survey is $j(i)$. As dependent variables, we use two indicators, one for individuals who reported being *worried* and another one for those *very worried* about getting infected. The indicator V_i takes the value of one if i was fully vaccinated by the time of the survey. Similarly as before, we provide instrumental variables

estimates using as instrument an indicator which takes the value of one if i was eligible to be fully vaccinated when surveyed. Our preferred specification also includes non-parametric controls for gender and education $f(x_i)$. Crucially for the identification strategy, equation (5) includes a complete set of age fixed effects $\phi_{j(i)}$ which allows us to econometrically compare individuals of the same age but who answered the survey when they were and were not eligible for the vaccine. Finally, $\eta_{ij(i)}$ is an error term clustered by age to allow for arbitrary correlation within age cohorts.

Table A.16 presents estimates of equation (5).[22] Column 1 and 2 use as dependent variable an indicator for people who reported being *worried* or *very worried* about getting infected by the virus. We observe 57% of respondents to be worried and 36% to be very worried. We find that vaccines decrease the probability of being worried or very worried by 5-6 percentage points, a decrease of 10-13% over the respective sample means. Column 3 confirms this result using the ordinal 1-5 response as dependent variable and an ordered probit for estimation. The lower concerns about the pandemic are mirrored in the optimism reported by survey respondents (columns 4-5). In particular, vaccines increase the probability of being optimistic about the future of the country by 7 percentage points, an increase of 18% over the sample mean.

B.2 Vaccines and the ability to focus in repeated surveys

We use waves of a nationally representative survey conducted by an independent research team in charge of studying the evolution of mental health during the pandemic. They implemented four waves of the same survey in July 2020, November 2020, April 2021, and August 2021. Approximately 1,500 individuals were surveyed in each wave, allowing us to examine how mental health evolved within individuals over time. We use these surveys to test for the empirical relationship between vaccines, concentration, and depression. Table A.15 provides descriptive statistics for the six measures related to mental health that can be tracked in all four waves of the survey.

Given that the same individuals were surveyed four times within a two-year period, the data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Econometrically, we exploit within-individual variation over time using the following econometric model:

$$y_{it} = \beta E_{it} + \gamma f(x_i) + \phi_i + \phi_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{6}$$

where y_{it} is an indicator for the response of individual i in month t, E_{it} takes the value of one if individual i was eligible for the vaccine in month t, ϕ_i is a full set of individual fixed effects, and ϕ_t represent wave fixed effects. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask for the vaccination status and thus we rely on the 70% take-up rate from sections 5.1 and B.1 to discuss instrumental variables estimates. We also include a flexible vector of controls $f(x_i)$ which include age fixed effects, individual-level controls (gender, education), and the number of covid cases in the region. The error term ϵ_{it} is clustered by municipality, and we employ weighted least squares with survey weights.

[22] To save space, we do not report the first-stage estimates in Table A.16. However, these estimates can be easily derived from the results presented in the reduced form (Panel B) and IV (Panel C). It is reassuring to note that the implied first-stage coefficient (i.e., 0.67) is remarkably close to the 70% take-up rate obtained in section 5.1 using variations in vaccination rates and the share of eligible individuals at the municipality level.

Panel A in Table A.17 presents estimates of equation (6) without individual fixed effects for comparison. Panel B in the same table shows estimates with individual fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 show that when individuals were eligible for the vaccine, their concentration improved. If we considered a take-up rate of 70% for the vaccine, then individuals who were fully vaccinated reported feeling overwhelmed 12 percentage points less than those not vaccinated. Moreover, vaccination leads to a 15 percentage points decrease in the probability of feeling not able to focus, a large decrease from a sample average of 40%. We do not find evidence of sleeping problems varying systematically with vaccines (column 3) and, consistent with the evidence from section B.1, individuals fully vaccinated report significantly lower feelings of depression (columns 4-6). The results are similar if we replace the dependent variable by the 1-4 ordered response (Table A.18)

B.3 Booster analysis

The May 2021 election took place when the pandemic was still generating high infection rates, lockdowns were common, uncertainty about the medium- and long-run consequences of the disease was substantial, and completing the vaccination schedule was perceived as essential for returning to normality. Under these conditions, vaccination plausibly played a central role in shaping political behavior, so our baseline estimates can be interpreted as capturing an upper bound of vaccine effects. By contrast, the November 2021 Presidential and Congressional elections occurred in a markedly different environment. More than 90% of the population had completed the primary vaccination schedule, uncertainty about the disease had declined, and vaccination campaigns focused mainly on booster doses. If vaccination primarily operates by reducing uncertainty and lowering participation costs, its political effects should be weaker in this later context. We use the November elections to test this hypothesis.

Table A.19 presents first-stage and instrumental variables results. Column 1 begins by estimating the impact of eligibility rules on vaccination rates. Eligibility rules changed weekly and thus the share of eligible people is different the week before the November election than the week of the May election. In addition, more than 90% of the population had the two doses and rules were in place mostly for booster vaccines (third doses). The estimate shows that compliance with the vaccine was lower, with less than a quarter of people who were offered the vaccine actually taking it, but still highly significant and different from zero with a F-statistic of 10.2.

Columns 2 and 5 in Table A.19 show that more vaccination leads to more political participation in the presidential and congress elections, but the point estimate is 30% smaller than in May. As the incumbent president was not a candidate in the presidential election, we propose two measures: (1) deviations from the political center derived from vote shares and an order of the seven candidates in a unidimensional left-right spectrum, and (2) vote shares of right-wing candidates as proxy for candidates from parties which were politically closer to the incumbent President. We find little evidence of impacts on the former but some evidence of higher preferences for challengers (left-wing) when vaccination rates were higher. Yet the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly smaller than in the May election. Studying preferences for incumbents in the Congress Election, we again fail to find evidence for vaccines tilting voters towards challengers (column 6). In all, we confirm the existence of attenuated impacts in the November election in terms of turnout and null

or attenuated effects in terms of vaccines increasing preferences for challengers.

B.4 Information acquisition as measured by invalid votes

The vaccines could have distorted the acquisition of information about candidates. There are at least two ways in which information acquisition could have been affected. First, vaccines could have changed the exposure to political campaigns, leading to fewer interactions between candidates and voters and to low information levels. Second, the overload of information about the disease and other events (e.g. vaccination) could have displaced information about candidates in the election. Limited attention and cognitive restrictions implies that voters might select and store a finite amount of information. If any of these or related informational mechanisms is at play, we should observe that voters had fewer information about candidates. Note that uninterested or apathetic voters can fall in any of these two categories, as collecting information is a decision.

Given the lack of data measuring how informed voters were, we can only test this hypothesis using proxies of information. We argue that less information about candidates could have been associated with more invalid or null votes.[23] Therefore, we repeat our main estimation strategy but replace the dependent variable by the percentage of invalid (blank or null) votes in the corresponding election. The results in Table A.20 suggest that vaccines did not affect the amount of information about candidates as vaccination rates are unrelated to the percentage of invalid votes in local elections. Overall, the sign of coefficients is unstable across elections and the point estimates are relatively small when compared to the impact of vaccines on incumbents. We conclude that information acquisition is unlikely to be the main explanation behind our findings.

[23]This interpretation is far from being the only possible one and there is an active research agenda studying how to interpret and what drives invalid voting. See Kouba and Lysek (2018) for a relatively recent meta-analysis.

Figure A.1: Geographic Distribution of Eligible and Vaccinated People



(a) Share of Eligible People (deciles) (b) Share of Vaccinated People (deciles)

Note: These figures present the geographic distribution across Chilean municipalities of the proportion of eligible (left figure) and vaccinated people (right figure) by the date of the election. Share of vaccinated people is defined as the number of people with two doses over the total number of people older than 18 years old (i.e. adult population) as measured by the 2020 projections.

Figure A.2: Randomization inference



(a) Effect of vaccines on political participation



(b) Effect of vaccines on vote share for incumbents

Note: These figures presents the distribution of point estimates from a series of regressions in which predicted share of adults with two doses are randomly assigned across municipalities 1,000 times. The dependent variable in A is turnout in the 2021 elections while in B is vote share of Incumbent in 2021 mayoral elections. The vertical lines denote point estimates from columns (1) from Panels B in Tables 3 and 5, respectively.

Figure A.3: Turnout by age bracket



Note: This figure reports instrumental variables estimates of equation (3) using turnout by age bracket as the dependent variable. For each age group, turnout is defined as the number of valid votes cast by individuals in that age bracket divided by the total number of registered voters in the same bracket. Estimates are obtained using the baseline specification with province fixed effects and the full set of controls. Vertical lines denote 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The figure shows that vaccination significantly increased turnout among younger voters, with smaller and statistically insignificant effects for older age groups.

Figure A.4: Robustness of results to control variables



(a) Effect of vaccines on political participation



(b) Effect of vaccines on vote share for incumbents

Note: These figures presents IV estimates of equation (3) using different combinations of control variables. The dependent variable in panel (a) is turnout in the 2021 elections while in panel (b) is the vote share for the incumbent in 2021 mayoral elections. The vertical lines denote the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A.1: (In)Validity of the booth-level design

		Univariate regression of covariate on closest distance to vaccination venue			
	Mean st. dev.	unconditional	conditional on municipality F.E.	conditional on municipality F.E. and controls	Standardized effect from (4)
Panel A: Political participation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Turnout 2020 Plebiscite	51.25	-0.081	0.681	0.545	0.04
	11.6	(0.539)	(0.558)	(0.579)	
Turnout 2017 Presidential Election	46.4	0.764	1.039	1.099	0.09
	10.6	(0.638)	(0.680)	(0.762)	
Turnout 2016 Local Election	35.0	3.705***	1.391**	0.624	0.03
	16.1	(1.382)	(0.684)	(0.511)	
Turnout 2013 Presidential Election	51.3	1.319	0.632	1.306	0.06
	14.6	(0.917)	(3.931)	(4.095)	
Turnout 2012 Local Election	46.1	3.299***	0.183	0.960	0.05
	14	(0.651)	(3.399)	(3.576)	
Panel B: Political preferences					
Supports new constitution 2020	77.5	-1.155	-1.084*	-1.318**	-0.09
	12.1	(1.013)	(0.619)	(0.634)	
Supports convention 2020	74.5	-1.264	-1.071*	-1.269**	-0.09
	12.2	(0.903)	(0.552)	(0.559)	
Vote share right-wing 2017	44.5	1.453	1.052**	1.336**	0.09
	11.6	(0.992)	(0.509)	(0.532)	
Vote share right-wing 2016	40.5	3.802*	0.413	0.694*	0.02
	21.6	(2.065)	(0.354)	(0.405)	
Vote share right-wing 2013	25.8	1.450	1.336*	1.672**	0.11
	11.3	(1.299)	(0.681)	(0.810)	
Vote share right-wing 2012	38.5	2.895	0.993**	1.294*	0.05
	19.7	(1.767)	(0.502)	(0.672)	
Vote share left-wing 2017	55.5	-1.453	-1.052**	-1.336**	-0.09
	11.6	(0.992)	(0.509)	(0.532)	
Vote share left-wing 2016	41.4	-2.835*	-0.425	-0.668*	-0.03
	20.4	(1.658)	(0.369)	(0.401)	
Vote share left-wing 2013	63.5	-0.423	-1.038*	-1.465**	-0.10
	10.7	(1.099)	(0.607)	(0.729)	
Vote share left-wing 2012	48.2	-2.698	-1.022**	-1.227*	-0.05
	18.7	(1.636)	(0.512)	(0.688)	
Vote Share Independent 2016	18.2	-0.968	0.011	-0.026	-0.00
	22.1	(1.431)	(0.236)	(0.239)	
Vote Share Independent 2012	13.2	-0.197	0.029	-0.067	-0.00
	18.7	(1.418)	(0.194)	(0.169)	

Notes: Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for 17 variables from previous elections (listed at the left). Columns 2 to 4 report point estimates and robust standard errors from OLS regressions of each covariate on the average distance from people's homes in a booth to the closest vaccination venue within their municipality of residence (Closest distance to vaccination venue). Column 2 shows unconditional results, column 3 conditions on municipality fixed effects, and column 4 conditions on municipality fixed effects and a restricted set of controls including percentage of women, average age, total number of people registered in the booth, and the distances from people's homes to the booth and the municipal hall. Due to missing data on the number of voters registered at the booth level for the 2012 and 2013 elections, balance tests for turnouts in those elections are performed for a restricted sample. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics from the 2017 Census

	Mean st. dev.	Univariate regression of covariate on instrument (mean instrument 64.3, st. dev. 9.27)			Standardized effect from (4)
		unconditional	conditional on province F.E.	conditional on province F.E. and controls	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Population women	49.0	0.037*	0.041	0.060*	0.10
	5.6	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.033)	
Population 0 to 4 yrs old	6.4	-0.037	-0.027	-0.036	-0.30
	1.1	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)	
Population 5 to 12yrs old	10.8	-0.006	0.008	-0.027	-0.14
	1.7	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.057)	
Population 12 to 18 yrs old	9.3	0.021	0.032	0.011	0.06
	1.7	(0.046)	(0.068)	(0.052)	
Labor Participation Rate	59.8	-0.582***	-0.434***	-0.400***	-0.38
	9.7	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.058)	
Labor Participation Rate, women	47.0	-0.698***	-0.540***	-0.448***	-0.40
	10.3	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.097)	
Unemployment Rate	7.0	0.030*	0.022	0.031	0.13
	2.3	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	
Unemployment Rate, women	11.5	0.112***	0.091**	0.070*	0.15
	4.3	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.039)	
Poor Household Rate (extensive)	6.4	-0.067**	-0.044	-0.037	-0.12
	2.9	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.049)	
Poor Household Rate (intensive)	1.4	-0.013	-0.009	-0.007	-0.09
	0.7	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	
Rural Population	0.4	0.009***	0.005***	0.001	0.03
	0.3	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	
Population with Primary Education	0.3	0.004***	0.003**	0.001	0.10
	0.1	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Population with Secondary Education	0.4	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.17
	0.1	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Population with Tertiary Education	0.2	-0.005***	-0.005	-0.003	-0.31
	0.1	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Municipalities	343				

Notes: Column 1 reports the mean value and standard deviation for 14 demographic and labor market variables from 2017 Census (listed at the left). Columns 2 to 4 report point estimates and robust standard errors from OLS regressions of each covariate on our instrument (i.e., share of people in priority groups). Column 2 shows unconditional results, column 3 conditions on 54 province fixed effects, and column 4 conditions on province fixed effects and a restricted set of controls including distance to the national capital (in logs), distance to the regional capital (in logs) and two indicators of population size (i.e., less than 50 thousand inhabitants and between 50 thousands and 100 thousands inhabitants). All regressions are weighted by local adult population in 2020. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.3: Additional descriptive statistics

		Univariate regression of covariate on instrument (mean instrument 64.3, st. dev. 9.27)			
	Mean st. dev.	unconditional	conditional on province F.E.	conditional on province F.E. and controls	Standardized effect from (4)
Panel A: 2017 National Survey	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log household income	12.5	-0.016***	-0.009	-0.006	-0.18
	0.3	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	
Poverty Rate	12.4	0.228***	-0.018	-0.038	-0.05
	7.3	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.058)	
Poverty Rate, multidimensional	26.1	0.095	0.156	0.031	0.03
	10.5	(0.095)	(0.120)	(0.124)	
Self-reported health score	18.1	0.135***	0.062**	0.053	0.15
	3.2	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.038)	
Permanent health condition	12.7	0.189***	0.098**	0.101**	0.20
	4.6	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.040)	
Malnutrition	7.4	0.052	0.046	0.018	0.04
	3.9	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.057)	
Lack of health insurance	5.3	-0.166***	-0.082	-0.091	-0.20
	4.3	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.075)	
Lack of social security	36.4	0.079	0.281**	0.204	0.17
	11.5	(0.124)	(0.137)	(0.145)	
Lack of basic services	14.3	0.313***	0.138*	0.008	0.01
	12.6	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.053)	
Log household subsidy	9.5	0.034***	0.021***	0.017***	0.37
	0.4	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Panel B: 2019 protests					
Protests per 100.000 inhab.	0.11	0.002***	0.000	0.001	0.01
	0.69	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Indicator for protest	0.56	-0.011***	-0.006	-0.001	-0.03
	0.50	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	
Indicator for riot	0.44	-0.013***	-0.006	0.003	0.05
	0.50	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
Municipalities (panel A)	323				
Municipalities (panel B)	343				

Notes: Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for 10 demographic and labor market variables from 2017 Census (panel A) and 3 variables related to the 2019 protests (panel B). Columns 2 to 4 report point estimates and robust standard errors from OLS regressions of each covariate on our instrument (i.e., share of people in priority groups). Column 2 shows unconditional results, column 3 conditions on 54 province fixed effects, and column 4 conditions on province fixed effects and a restricted set of controls including distance to the national capital (in logs), distance to the regional capital (in logs) and two indicators of population size (i.e., less than 50 thousand inhabitants and between 50 thousands and 100 thousands inhabitants). The source for the protest variables in panel B is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). We count the number of protests between 6 October and 15 November (2019). Regressions are weighted by local adult population in 2020. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for the pandemic before the vaccines and before the election

		Univariate regression of covariate on instrument (mean instrument 64.3, st. dev. 9.27)			
	Mean st. dev.	unconditional	conditional on province F.E.	conditional on province F.E. and controls	Standardized effect from (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Before Vaccination Campaign					
Share of lockdown days	7.0	-0.310**	-0.137	0.002	0.00
	9.7	(0.151)	(0.113)	(0.104)	
COVID infections per 10,000	277.7	-4.595**	1.042	1.701	0.10
	159.7	(1.931)	(1.788)	(1.842)	
COVID deaths per 10,000	5.8	-0.161**	0.256**	0.278**	0.50
	5.2	(0.076)	(0.112)	(0.111)	
Vaccination centers per 100,000	24.3	0.540***	0.445***	0.351***	0.07
	48.4	(0.080)	(0.139)	(0.103)	
Week Before Election					
Share of lockdown days	45.4	-0.110	0.537	0.736	0.14
	46.6	(0.595)	(0.549)	(0.648)	
COVID infections per 10,000	31.44	0.329***	0.191	0.168	0.06
	26.1	(0.111)	(0.136)	(0.160)	
COVID deaths per 10,000	0.59	0.013***	0.023***	0.023***	0.23
	0.89	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
Municipalities	343				

Notes: The inclusion of the three indicators of pandemic severity the week before the election was not originally specified in our pre-analysis plan. Column 1 reports the mean value and standard deviation for 4 variables related to the pandemic (listed at the left). All pre-vaccination campaign covid figures are measured until first day of the vaccination campaign (December 23, 2020). Columns 2 to 4 report point estimates and robust standard errors from OLS regressions of each covariate on our instrument (i.e., share of people in priority groups). Column 2 shows unconditional results, column 3 conditions on 54 province fixed effects, and column 4 conditions on province fixed effects and a restricted set of controls including distance to the national capital (in logs), distance to the regional capital (in logs) and two indicators of population size (i.e., less than 50 thousand inhabitants and between 50 thousands and 100 thousands inhabitants). All regressions are weighted by local adult population. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.5: Vaccination and political participation when controlling non-linearly for unbalances

		Share of valid votes			
	General turnout	Mayor	Constitutional convention	Councilors	Governors
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share of adults with two doses	0.136***	0.130***	0.118***	0.179***	0.123***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.041)
Panel B: Reduced form					
Share of eligible people	0.105**	0.100**	0.091**	0.138***	0.095**
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Panel B: OLS					
Share of adults with two doses	0.061*	0.054	0.078***	0.074**	0.079***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Observations	324	324	324	324	324
Province fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X
Basic set of controls	X	X	X	X	X
Quintiles of unbalanced covariates	X	X	X	X	X
First-stage F-statistic	73.46	73.46	73.46	73.46	73.46
Avg. dependent variable	47.86	46.86	40.89	45.39	42.15
St. dev. dependent variable	8.7	8.6	6.8	8.6	7.2

Notes: All regressions are weighted by the local adult population. The set of unbalanced covariates (discretionalized into quintiles) are turnout in 2017 presidential election, labor participation rate, share of women in population, labor participation rate of women, unemployment rate of women, prevalence of permanent health conditions, average household subsidy (in logs), total covid deaths per 10,000 inhabitants (in logs), and number of vaccination centers per 100,000 inhabitants. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.6: Spatial spillovers of eligibility rules

Dependent variable: Share of adults with two doses					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share of eligible people	0.299*	-0.206	-0.166	-0.077	-0.080
in neighboring municipalities	(0.153)	(0.278)	(0.275)	(0.185)	(0.165)
R-squared	0.059	0.328	0.381	0.646	0.701
Avg. dependent variable	49.86	49.86	49.86	48.58	48.58
Province fixed effects		X	X	X	X
Basic controls			X	X	X
Unbalanced covariates				X	X
2020 Plebiscite controls					X
Observations	340	340	340	323	323

Notes: The share of eligible people in neighboring municipalities is computed as the population-weighted mean of the share of target population in neighboring municipalities. The share of target population in each municipality is computed as the sum of population working in health services, transportation, education, and public administration, population with chronic diseases, and population older than 50 years old; all as shares of adult population. The basic set of controls includes distance to national capital (in logs), distance to regional capital (in logs) and two indicators of population size (i.e., less than 50 thousand inhabitants and between 50 thousands and 100 thousands inhabitants). The set of unbalanced covariates includes turnout in 2017 presidential election, labor participation rate, share of women in population, labor participation rate of women, unemployment rate of women, prevalence of permanent health conditions, average household subsidy (in logs), total covid deaths per 10,000 inhabitants (in logs), and number of vaccination centers per 100,000 inhabitants. All covid figures are measured until first day of the vaccination campaign (December 23, 2020). 2020 Plebiscite controls include turnout and vote share for approval. Regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.7: Spatial spillovers of political impacts

Dependent variable measured in neighboring municipalities:				
	Turnout		Vote share incumbent mayor	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of adults with two doses	-0.123	-0.112	-0.125	-0.118
	(0.103)	(0.071)	(0.256)	(0.273)
Observations	323	323	323	323
Avg. dependent variable	43.39	43.39	37.9	37.9
First-stage F-statistic	48.1	53.4	53.3	48.1
Full set of controls	X	X	X	X
Lagged dep. variable (neighbors)		X		X

Notes: The share of target population in each municipality is computed as the sum of population working in health services, transportation, education, and public administration, population with chronic diseases, and population older than 50 years old; all as shares of adult population. The full set of controls includes distance to national capital (in logs), distance to regional capital (in logs) and two indicators of population size (i.e., less than 50 thousand inhabitants and between 50 thousands and 100 thousands inhabitants), turnout in 2017 presidential election, labor participation rate, share of women in population, labor participation rate of women, unemployment rate of women, prevalence of permanent health conditions, average household subsidy (in logs), total covid deaths per 10,000 inhabitants (in logs), and number of vaccination centers per 100,000 inhabitants, and the 2020 Plebiscite controls. All covid figures are measured until first day of the vaccination campaign (December 23, 2020). Regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.8: Characterization of compliers I

	Treated	Untreated	Full sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Turnout 2020 Plebiscite	46.57	47.36	51.37
Turnout 2017 Presidential Election	39.28	45.53	44.57
Turnout 2016 Local Election	40.14	37.49	34.27
Turnout 2013 Presidential Election	39.28	45.53	44.57
Turnout 2012 Local Election	49.98	46.66	42.65
Supports new constitution 2020	78.64	74.88	78.00
Supports convention 2020	74.63	71.58	74.77
Vote share right-wing 2017	42.64	47.80	44.01
Vote share right-wing 2016	36.35	32.78	38.20
Vote share right-wing 2013	19.49	22.42	24.27
Vote share right-wing 2012	31.63	31.41	35.89
Vote share left-wing 2017	57.36	52.20	55.99
Vote share left-wing 2016	40.99	56.94	40.74
Vote share left-wing 2013	67.92	64.70	63.09
Vote share left-wing 2012	57.19	49.66	46.67
Vote share Independent 2016	13.36	5.52	15.60
Vote share Independent 2012	7.77	14.10	12.09

Notes: This table presents an empirical characterization of the complier municipalities. See Abadie et al. (2002) for details. The treatment in this exercise is an indicator that takes the value one if the share of adults with two doses is above the median of the empirical distribution.

Table A.9: Characterization of compliers II

	Treated	Untreated	Full sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Census			
Population Women	51.10	51.16	51.08
Population 0 to 4 yrs old	6.08	7.31	6.63
Population 5 to 12yrs old	10.45	11.79	10.73
Population 12 to 18 yrs old	9.64	10.15	9.50
Labor Participation Rate	56.63	63.63	62.88
Labor Participation Rate, women	44.67	51.52	51.93
Unemployment Rate	8.30	7.65	7.19
Unemployment Rate, women 2017	12.64	11.37	10.13
Poor Household Rate (extensive)	7.39	6.44	6.13
Poor Household Rate (intensive)	1.62	1.42	1.35
Rural Population	0.20	0.17	0.12
Population with Primary Education	0.31	0.29	0.24
Population with Secondary Education	0.39	0.36	0.37
Population with Tertiary Education	0.14	0.19	0.23
Survey			
Log household income	12.42	12.54	12.72
Poverty Rate	11.47	12.69	8.51
Poverty Rate, multidimensional	22.90	21.41	21.12
Self-reported health score	18.91	18.67	17.28
Permanent health condition	13.43	11.74	11.38
Malnutrition	8.43	6.77	6.64
Lack of health insurance	5.52	6.55	6.28
Lack of social security	35.50	34.17	34.73
Lack of basic services	7.12	6.84	6.67
Log household subsidy	9.57	9.31	9.15
Pandemic			
Share of lockdown days	10.83	12.39	15.42
COVID infections per 10,000	323.41	301.01	341.61
COVID deaths per 10,000	8.06	4.51	8.81
Vaccination centers per 100,000	12.06	2.09	7.10
2019 protests			
Protests per 100,000	0.06	0.03	0.05
Indicator protest	0.64	0.57	0.85
Indicator riot	0.66	0.54	0.82

Notes: This table presents an empirical characterization of the complier municipalities. See Abadie et al. (2002) for details. The treatment in this exercise is an indicator that takes the value one if the share of adults with two doses is above the median of the empirical distribution.

Table A.10: Partisanship in local councilors elections

	Vote Share for			
	Incumbent	Left-Wing	Right-Wing	Independent
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of adults with two doses	-0.116	-0.081	0.110	0.084
	(0.150)	(0.203)	(0.142)	(0.155)
	[0.318]	[0.706]	[0.333]	[0.192]
First-Stage Statistic	47.96	51.96	51.09	52.21
Panel B: Reduced Form				
Share of people in priority groups	-0.076	-0.054	0.073	0.022
	(0.111)	(0.153)	(0.106)	(0.146)
	[0.308]	[0.704]	[0.351]	[0.794]
R-squared	0.483	0.767	0.887	0.449
Panel C: OLS				
Share of adults with two doses	-0.010	-0.026	0.092	-0.042
	(0.085)	(0.120)	(0.072)	(0.098)
	[0.848]	[0.618]	[0.020]	[0.390]
R-squared	0.482	0.767	0.888	0.449
Mean of dep variable	17.44	56.36	35.05	33.95
Std deviation of dep variable	8.38	11.99	12.54	10.96

Notes: The unit of observation in Panels A, B, and C is a municipality. The number of observations in Panels A, B, and C is 324. Regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values from standard errors adjusted for spatial autocorrelation in brackets (Conley, 1999). Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. First-stage statistic reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.

Table A.11: Number of competitors per election

	Dep. variable: Competitors per 1,000 voters			
	Mayors	Constitution	Governors	Councilors
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of adults with two doses	0.002	0.065**	0.005**	0.019
	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
Share of eligible people	0.002	0.044**	0.004**	0.013
	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Panel C: OLS				
Share of adults with two doses	-0.001	0.003	-0.000	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.013)
Observations	324	324	324	324
Province fixed effects	X	X	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X	X	X
Avg. dependent variable	0.3	4.7	0.4	2.2

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). See Table 2 for the description of the full set of controls. All regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.12: Number of competitors in local elections by coalition

	Dep. variable: Competitors per 1,000 voters			
	Total	Left-wing	Right-wing	Independent
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of adults with two doses	0.002	0.002***	0.001**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
Share of eligible people	0.002	0.002***	0.001*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Panel C: OLS				
Share of adults with two doses	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Observations	324	324	324	324
Province fixed effects	X	X	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X	X	X
Avg. dependent variable	0.259	0.087	0.066	0.106

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). See Table 2 for the description of the full set of controls. All regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.13: Partisanship in governors election

	Vote Share for		
	Left-Wing	Right-Wing	Independent
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share of adults with two doses	-0.091	0.193***	-0.038
	(0.121)	(0.070)	(0.091)
	[0.486]	[0.067]	[0.619]
First-Stage Statistic	49.21	49.21	49.21
Panel B: Reduced Form			
Share of people in priority groups	-0.060	0.128**	-0.025
	(0.089)	(0.051)	(0.068)
	[0.497]	[0.090]	[0.623]
R-squared	0.949	0.940	0.954
Panel C: OLS			
Share of adults with two doses	-0.001	0.115***	-0.058
	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.047)
	[0.993]	[0.059]	[0.103]
R-squared	0.949	0.941	0.954
Mean of dep variable	46.54	23.21	19.07
Std deviation of dep variable	15.96	9.94	14.00

Notes: The unit of observation in Panels A, B, and C is a municipality. The number of observations in Panels A, B, and C is 324. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values from standard errors adjusted for spatial autocorrelation in brackets (Conley, 1999). Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. First-stage statistic reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.

Table A.14: Robustness to measures of incumbent performance

	Low-performing municipalities	High-performing municipalities
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Municipal income		
Share of adults with two doses	-3.302***	-2.405**
	(1.194)	(1.042)
Observations	155	169
Province fixed effects	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X
Panel B: Standardized test scores		
Share of adults with two doses	-2.257*	-0.999*
	(1.285)	(0.537)
Observations	174	150
Province fixed effects	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X

Notes: This table reports instrumental-variables estimates of the effect of vaccination rates on incumbent vote share, allowing for heterogeneity by alternative measures of incumbent performance. In each panel, municipalities are classified as low- or high-performing based on a median split of the corresponding performance measure. Panel A uses a measure of municipal income per capita that excludes transfers from the central government and therefore reflects own-source revenues that depend more directly on mayoral effort and local revenue management. Panel B uses changes in standardized test scores (SIMCE) in public schools between mayoral terms as a salient indicator of municipal performance. All regressions are weighted by adult population and include province fixed effects and the full set of controls described in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Summary statistics mental health measures

		Ordered measure				Indicator measure				
Variable		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Feel overwhelmed	overall	3.28	0.83	1	4	0.83	0.38	0	1	N = 5783
	between		0.64	1	4		0.28	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.59	1.03	5.28		0.29	0.08	1.58	T-bar = 2.65
Not able to focus	overall	2.38	0.71	1	4	0.40	0.49	0	1	N = 5783
	between		0.55	1	4		0.39	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.51	0.38	4.38		0.33	-0.35	1.15	T-bar = 2.65
Sleeping problems	overall	3.26	0.83	1	4	0.84	0.37	0	1	N = 5783
	between		0.64	1	4		0.27	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.60	1.01	5.51		0.28	0.09	1.59	T-bar = 2.65
Cannot enjoy	overall	2.45	0.80	1	4	0.45	0.50	0	1	N = 5783
	between		0.61	1	4		0.38	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.58	0.45	4.70		0.36	-0.30	1.20	T-bar = 2.65
Feel depressed	overall	2.99	0.89	1	4	0.74	0.44	0	1	N = 5783
	between		0.67	1	4		0.32	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.65	0.74	4.99		0.34	-0.01	1.49	T-bar = 2.65
Worse mood	overall	3.33	0.90	1	5	0.85	0.35	0	1	N = 5783
pre-pandemic	between		0.70	1	5		0.26	0	1	n = 2184
	within		0.62	0.58	6.08		0.26	0.10	1.60	T-bar = 2.65

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). Sample consists in 4 waves of survey implemented in July 2020, November 2021, March 2022, and August 2022. All dependent variables are ordered variables increasing in levels of mental or psychological distress. Original questions allows a 4-scale answer: much less than usual, less than usual, the same as usual, more than usual. "Feel Overwhelmed" asks "Have you been feeling constantly overwhelmed and tense?"; "Feel not Able to Focus" asks "Have you been able to focus on what you're doing?"; "Sleeping Problems" asks "Have your worries caused you to lose a lot of sleep?"; "Cannot Enjoy" asks "Have you been able to enjoy your normal daily activities?"; "Depressed" asks "Have you been feeling unhappy and depressed?"; "Worse Mood Pre-Pandemia" asks "In comparison to your mood prior to the Corona Virus pandemic, how have you been feeling?".

Table A.16: Vaccines and anxiety in high-frequency surveys (n.p.s)

Dependent variable:	Concern about Covid			Optimism about country	
	Indicator worried	Indicator very worried	Ordered	Indicator optimistic	Ordered
Panel A: OLS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fully vaccinated	0.019*	0.013	0.095***	0.028***	0.082***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Panel B: Reduced form					
Eligible for vaccine	-0.042***	-0.035***	-0.126***	0.049***	0.129***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Panel C: IV					
Fully vaccinated	-0.063***	-0.052***	-0.188***	0.073***	0.192***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.031)
First-stage statistic	1335	1335	1335	1297	1297
Avg. dependent variable	0.58	0.36	3.58	0.40	3.1
Age fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X
Covid control	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	22,269	22,269	22,269	22,116	22,116

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). Sample consists in 32 waves of survey implemented from February to September 2021. Fully vaccinated takes value 1 if individual declares having at least two doses of the vaccine. Eligible takes value 1 if individual's age is such that individual is eligible for the second dose of the vaccine at the time of the survey. Concern about covid is based on the question "how worried are you about contracting covid?" and follows a 5-point scale taking value of 1 (none), 2 (a little), 3 (some), 4 (quite a lot) and 5 (a lot). The variable worried takes value of 1 if concern is above 3, 0 otherwise. The variable very worried takes value of 1 if concern takes value of 5, 0 otherwise. Optimism about the country is based on the question "how do you feel about the future of your country?" and follows a 5-point scale taking value of 1 (very pessimistic), 2 (pessimistic), 3 (neither pessimistic nor optimistic), 4 (optimistic) and 5 (very optimistic). The variable optimistic takes value of 1 if optimism about the country is above 3, 0 otherwise. Individual controls are a gender dummy and 9 education dummies. Covid control represents a two-weeks average of daily COVID infections per 10,000 at the regional level. Robust standard errors clustered at the wave-region level in parenthesis. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.17: Vaccine-eligibility and mental health in surveys (n.p.s)

	Feel overwhelmed	Feel not able to focus	Sleeping problems	Cannot enjoy	Feel depressed	Worse mood pre-covid
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Eligible for vaccine	-0.088***	-0.066***	-0.029	-0.101***	-0.047**	-0.101***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Panel B: Individual fixed effects						
Eligible for vaccine	-0.083***	-0.106***	-0.020	-0.099***	-0.026	-0.093***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Observations (panel A)	5,770	5,770	5,770	5,770	5,764	5,770
Observations (panel B)	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,237
Avg. dependent variable	0.83	0.40	0.84	0.45	0.74	0.85
Age fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Covid control	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). Sample consists in 4 waves of survey implemented in July 2020, November 2021, March 2022, and August 2022. Eligible for Vaccine takes value 1 if individual's age is such that individual is eligible for the second dose of the vaccine at the time of the survey. All dependent variables are dummies denoting high levels of mental or psychological distress. Original questions allows a 4-scale answer: much less than usual, less than usual, the same as usual, more than usual. "Feel Overwhelmed" asks "Have you been feeling constantly overwhelmed and tense?"; "Feel not Able to Focus" asks "Have you been able to focus on what you're doing?"; "Sleeping Problems" asks "Have your worries caused you to lose a lot of sleep?"; "Cannot Enjoy" asks "Have you been able to enjoy your normal daily activities?"; "Depressed" asks "Have you been feeling unhappy and depressed?"; "Worse Mood Pre-Pandemia" asks "In comparison to your mood prior to the Corona Virus pandemic, how have you been feeling?". Individual controls are a gender dummy and 8 education dummies. Covid control represents a two-weeks average of daily COVID infections per 10,000 at the regional level. Robust standard errors clustered at the wave-region level in parenthesis. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.18: Eligibility and mental health in surveys, ordered responses (n.p.s)

	Feel overwhelmed	Feel not able to focus	Sleeping problems	Cannot enjoy	Feel depressed	Worse mood pre-covid
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Eligible for vaccine	-0.158***	-0.081***	-0.078*	-0.211***	-0.129***	-0.353***
	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Panel B: Individual fixed effect						
Eligible for vaccine	-0.173***	-0.121***	-0.088**	-0.198***	-0.110***	-0.358***
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Observations (panel A)	5,770	5,770	5,770	5,770	5,764	5,770
Observations (panel B)	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,242	5,237
Avg. dependent variable	3.28	2.38	3.26	2.45	2.99	3.33
Age fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Covid control	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). Sample consists in 4 waves of survey implemented in July 2020, November 2021, March 2022, and August 2022. Eligible for Vaccine takes value 1 if individual's age is such that individual is eligible for the second dose of the vaccine at the time of the survey. All dependent variables are ordered variables increasing in levels of mental or psychological distress. Original questions allows a 4-scale answer: much less than usual, less than usual, the same as usual, more than usual. "Feel Overwhelmed" asks "Have you been feeling constantly overwhelmed and tense?"; "Feel not Able to Focus" asks "Have you been able to focus on what you're doing?"; "Sleeping Problems" asks "Have your worries caused you to lose a lot of sleep?"; "Cannot Enjoy" asks "Have you been able to enjoy your normal daily activities?"; "Depressed" asks "Have you been feeling unhappy and depressed?"; "Worse Mood Pre-Pandemia" asks "In comparison to your mood prior to the Corona Virus pandemic, how have you been feeling?". Individual controls are a gender dummy and 8 education dummies. Covid control represents a two-weeks average of daily COVID infections per 10,000 at the regional level. Robust standard errors clustered at the wave-region level in parenthesis. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.19: Booster and electoral outcomes in November 2021 (n.p.s.)

		Presidential Election			Congress Election	
	Share of adults with three doses	Turnout	Deviation from political center	Right-wing vote share	Turnout	Vote share incumbents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of eligible people	0.218***					
	(0.068)					
Share of adults with *three* doses		0.117**	-0.004	-0.227*	0.120*	-0.005
		(0.059)	(0.004)	(0.117)	(0.066)	(0.004)
Observations	318	318	318	318	318	318
Province fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Avg. dependent variable	47.01	46.90	0.58	53.08	42.46	27.75
St. dev. dependent variable	11.48	5.68	0.44	10.35	6.09	14.15
First-stage F-statistic	–	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.2

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). The share of eligible people is computed following the eligibility rules up to the week of the Presidential and Congress Election (November 15-19, 2021). See Table 2 for the description of the full set of controls. All regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

Table A.20: Blank and null votes per election

	Dep. variable: % of invalid (blank/null) votes			
	Mayors	Constitution	Governors	Councilors
Panel A: Instrumental variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of adults with two doses	-0.005	0.004	-0.013	-0.024**
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.011)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
Share of eligible people	-0.003	0.003	-0.009	-0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Panel C: OLS				
Share of adults with two doses	0.002	-0.016	-0.038***	-0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.005)
Observations	324	324	324	324
Province fixed effects	X	X	X	X
Full set of controls	X	X	X	X
Avg. dependent variable	1.0	6.3	5.5	2.3

Notes: Additional empirical analysis which was not pre-specified (n.p.s). See Table 2 for the description of the full set of controls. All regressions are weighted by voting age population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.